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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been some question as to whether the
Minnesota Legislature intended Minnesota Statute section 609.66,
1
subdivision 1d to require mens rea. The statute, adopted in 1993,
2
outlaws dangerous weapons on school property. The Minnesota
Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in June of 2000 in In re
† B.A. in criminal justice from Gustavus Adolphus College; J.D. William
Mitchell College of Law expected 2003.
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (7th ed. 1999). Mens rea is defined as “[t]he
state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a
defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness.” Id. Mens
rea is an essential element of every crime at common law. See id.
2. MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d (2000). Section 609.66, subdivision 1d(a),
as amended in 1994, reads as follows:
Whoever possesses, stores, or keeps a dangerous weapon or uses or
brandishes a replica firearm or a BB gun on school property is guilty of a
felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two
years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d(a).
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3

C.R.M. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, holding that section 609.66,
subdivision 1d, requires the state to prove that a defendant had
knowledge of possession of the dangerous weapon while on school
4
property. In ruling on this issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court
correctly interpreted section 609.66, subdivision 1d, as not
dispensing with mens rea.
This note briefly examines the general history behind the
concept of mens rea, and the history of decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and Minnesota courts regarding the mens rea
requirement in enforcement of statutes enacted for the welfare of
the public. This note also explores the history of section 609.66,
subdivision 1d. Part III considers the supreme court’s holding in In
re C.R.M. Part IV analyzes the court’s approach. The note
concludes that the court’s ruling is in accordance with the long
established principle of American criminal jurisprudence that
common law crimes and felony level offenses require mens rea.
II. HISTORY
A. Early History of Mens Rea
For centuries, western civilized nations have looked at the
intent behind a wrongdoer’s act to determine “both the propriety
5
and the grading of punishment.” The basic premise that in order
for an actor to be held criminally liable some mens rea is required, is
expressed by the Latin maxim actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an
6
act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty). However,
7
ancient English law tended towards strict liability for acts.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, unqualified
acceptance of the concept of mens rea within English criminal law
was indicated by Blackstone’s statement: “So that to constitute a
crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and,
3. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 2000).
4. Id. at 810. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether
appellant had the requisite knowledge.
5. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. 485, 489–92 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (providing a concise analysis of the early history of the mens rea
requirement).
6. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4(a) at 212
(1986).
7. See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 490.
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secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.”
By the time the Constitution incorporated the right to a jury
trial and the concept of due process through its first amendments,
9
mens rea was an already established, general rule of law. Mens rea is
a safeguard for beliefs firmly embedded “within our traditions of
10
individual liberty, responsibility and duty.” As state statutory
criminal law slowly came into effect, even where mens rea was not
expressly provided for in their enactments, state courts “assumed
that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle” only
that the concept was so inherent in the crime itself that it required
11
no express declaration.
The history of mens rea has been marked by development,
adjustment, and shifting attitudes. Legislative exceptions to the
common law rule have come to be known as “public welfare
12
offenses” or “regulatory offenses.” These duties and crimes, the
violation of which “result in no direct or immediate injury to
person or property but merely create the danger or probability of
it”, are not subject to a presumption requiring proof of a mens rea to
13
establish liability. Accordingly, the state need only prove that a
prohibited act was performed regardless of what the actor knew or
14
did not know and intended or did not intend).
Public welfare offenses were a response to the new dangers
15
brought about by the arrival of the industrial revolution. The
increased number of people exposed to injury due to new
technologies, traffic, the congestion of cities, the overcrowding of
quarters, and the wide distribution of goods during this period all
8. Id. at 492 (citing II WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *20-21).
9. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 495-96.
10. Id.
11. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
12. Id. at 252-56.
13. Id. at 255-56. However, “the rationale for eliminating such a presumption
is that regulatory statutes impose liability” for conduct that should reasonably put
the actor on notice that he or she is engaging in conduct inherently dangerous to
the public. See In Re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 806 (citing Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610-11
(1994) (finding that “[i]n the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of
acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger.”)
14. See People v. Hudick, 551 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Mich. 1996).
15. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 419 (Mar. 1993) (discussing the implications of the
criminal strict liability doctrine and the good faith defense).
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led to increasingly numerous and detailed regulations, “which
heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries” and
16
activities that affect the public’s health and welfare.
The pioneer of the movement towards criminal strict liability
in this country seems to be a decision that “a tavernkeeper could be
convicted for selling liquor to a habitual drunkard even if he did
17
not know the buyer to be such.” By the turn of the century,
regardless of fault, criminal liability could be attached in situations
where the actor’s conduct involved: “minor violations of liquor
laws, the pure food laws, the anti-narcotics laws, motor vehicle and
traffic regulations, sanitary, building and factory laws and the
18
like.” These regulatory measures were “in the exercise of what is
called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is
evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than
19
the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.”
B. United States Supreme Court History
Against this conceptual background, the United States
Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions, some expanding
and maintaining the mens rea principle and others seemingly
disregarding it. This being said, “[t]he existence of a mens rea is the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-

16. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254.
17. Id. at 256 (citing Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849)).
18. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. 485, 496 (E.D. NY 1993)
(quoting Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78
(1933) (hereinafter Public Welfare)). For example, “[I]n Massachusetts, a person
[could] be convicted of the crime of selling intoxicating liquor as a beverage,
though he [or she] did not know it to be intoxicating.” See People v. Roby, 18 N.W.
365, 366 (Mich. 1884) (citing Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass.(1
Allen)(1861)). Likewise, “[e]vidence of a guilty intent and a guilty knowledge on
the part of [a defendant were] not necessary to warrant a conviction” for the
offense of selling adulterated milk. State v. Smith, 10 R.I. 258, 260-61 (1872).
19. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922). Chief Justice Thomas
Cooley, writing for the Michigan Supreme Court, concisely described the publicwelfare doctrine in light of the general rule that a criminal statute requires a mens
rea:
I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but
this is not by any means a universal rule . . . . Many statutes which are in
the nature of police regulations . . . impose criminal penalties
irrespective of any intent to violate them, the purpose being to require a
degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render
violation impossible.
Roby, 18 N.W. at 366.
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American criminal jurisprudence.” Generally speaking, mens rea
21
still remains an indispensable element of a crime. In a much-cited
passage from Morissette v. United States, Mr. Justice Jackson speaking
for the Court observed:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime
only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
22
normal individual to choose between good and evil.
On a number of different occasions, the United States
Supreme Court has read the common law rule requiring mens rea
into an offense even where the statute’s language did not in
23
express terms so provide. The mens rea presumption has not only
been read into statutes codifying common-law crimes, but also
24
where a particular offense is solely statutory in nature.
The Court has interpreted public welfare statutes as
eliminating the requirement of a “guilty mind” as an element of a
25
crime. These regulatory offenses are recognized in “limited
26
circumstances.” Usually, public welfare offenses are recognized as
those that involve statutes that deal with particularly harmful or
27
injurious items. However, the Court is careful to point out that
20. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)
(citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
21. See id. at 437.
22. Morissete, 342 U.S. at 250.
23. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437, 443 (concluding that criminal
offenses defined by the Sherman Act are to be construed as including intent as an
element).
24. See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 620 n.1 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.
concurring) (observing that the Court has “not confined the presumption of mens
rea to statutes codifying traditional common-law offenses, but [has] also applied
the presumption to offenses that are ‘entirely a creature of statute.’”). In general,
“when an act is prohibited and made punishable by statute only, the statute is to
be construed in the light of the common law and the existence of criminal intent
is to be regarded as essential, although the terms of the statute do not require it.”
ROLLIN M. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 741 n.17 (2d ed. 1969) (quoting
State v. Shedoudy, 118 P.2d 280, 285 (N.M. 1941)).
25. Staples, 511 U.S. at 607, n.3. “Under such statutes [the Court has] not
required that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct fit the
definition of the offense.” Id.
26. Id. at 607 (citing United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437).
27. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (interpreting
the revised National Firearms Act as a regulatory measure in the interest of public
safety, which can “be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act” and subject to no
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neither it nor, so far as it is aware, has any other court “undertaken
to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for
distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and
28
crimes that do not.”
Historically, a statute’s penalty plays an important role in the
Court’s determination of whether the statute constitutes a public
welfare offense, and thereby dispensing with the intent
29
requirement. The Court has observed that the public welfare
30
analysis hardly seems appropriate for a felony offense. A severe
penalty is an indication of legislative intent not to eliminate mens
31
rea as an element of a crime. “In such a case, the usual
presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his
32
conduct illegal should apply.”
The elimination of a mens rea requirement from a given
offense essentially clears the path straight towards the conviction of
33
an alleged offender.” The Court is “reluctant to impute [such a]
purpose where . . . it would mean easing the path to convicting
persons whose conduct would not even alert them to the
34
probability of strict regulation in the form of a statute . . . .”
C. Minnesota History
The legislative authority to create criminal strict liability

regulations).
28. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).
29. Staples, 511 U.S. at 616. Commonly, the penalties for public welfare
offenses “are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an
offender’s reputation.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. “[T]he penalty for a civil offense
[i.e., a public welfare offense] should never be severe. The maximum should be a
moderate fine or something of a comparable nature. It should never include
imprisonment.” PERKINS, supra note 24, at 794.
30. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994).
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 615 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263). “The purpose and obvious
effect of eliminating the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s
path to conviction.” Id.
34. See id. at 615-16. The Court usually looks upon offenses that have no mens
rea requirement with disapproval. See id. at 606 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 426 (1985)). “Given the Morissette [sic] holding, tone, and general
discussion of the nature of criminal laws, many courts not surprisingly view the
decision as a license to interpret statutes with harsh penalties as implicitly
requiring a culpable mens rea.” Levenson, supra note 15, at 429. In fact, “[c]ourts
are [more likely] to take this approach when the defendant in a strict liability case
proffers a mistake of fact defense.” Id.
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offenses has been recognized in Minnesota. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has acknowledged the idea that while a person
need not intend his act to be criminal, it is essential that he should
36
intend to do the act that is criminal. Consistent with this notion,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a mens rea requirement
is to be incorporated as a matter of law into statutory crimes despite
37
the legislature having not expressly stated such a requirement.
The distinction between strict liability crimes and those
requiring a mens rea has been recognized in both Minnesota case
38
law and statutes. Section 609.02, subdivision 9 provides definitions
39
for chapter 609 offenses. Up until its ruling in In re C.R.M., the
Minnesota Supreme Court had yet to rule on whether, under
section 609.02, a chapter 609 offense must be interpreted as a strict
liability crime where it contains no language indicating intent or
40
knowledge as a requirement. However, in several opinions, the
court had addressed whether mere “possession” in various contexts
41
requires a mens rea.
35. See State v. Morse, 281 Minn. 378, 383-84, 161 N.W.2d 699, 702-03 (1968).
The legislature has the power to create strict liability offenses as long as this intent
is made clear in the statute. State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1987); see,
e.g., State v. Mayard, 573 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing
Minn. Stat. section 169.791, subdivision 2, as a strict liability crime based on the
plain language of the statute).
36. See State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962). The
legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal
without regard to intent or knowledge on the part of the party committing the act,
subject to the qualification that he intended to do the act that constituted the
crime. Id.
37. See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 1996)(stating “if the
legislature chooses to not include an intent requirement into a statutory crime,
one is implied as a matter of law”); see also State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 30
(Minn. 1983) (stating “[a] criminal state of mind, or mens rea, is a required
element of any crime originating in the common law, and where not specified in
the statute is implied as a matter of law.”).
38. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 807 (Minn. 2000).
39. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(1)-(4) (2000). Section 609.02, subdivision
9(1) provides that “[w]hen criminal intent is an element of a crime in this
chapter, such intent is indicated by the term ‘intentionally,’ the phrase ‘with
intent to,’ the phrase ‘with intent that,’ or some form of the verbs ‘know’ or
‘believe.’” Id.
40. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 807.
41. Id. See, e.g., State v. Strong, 294 N.W.2d 319, 320 (Minn. 1980) (holding
that in prosecution for the introduction of contraband into prison, the state must
prove scienter); State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975)
(holding that in order to convict a defendant of the felony offense of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, the state must prove that defendant
consciously possessed the substance and had actual knowledge of its nature); Cf.
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D. History of Section 609.66, Subdivision 1d
Considering totals of nonfatal crime (that is, serious violent
crime plus simple assault), students ages twelve through eighteen
were victims of about 2.7 million crimes while they were at school
42
in 1998. In general, while crime may have decreased in recent
years, violence at school and to and from school can lead to
disruptive and threatening environments reducing student
43
performance. Concern over school crime and violence has driven
many public schools to implement a variety of measures aimed at
44
reducing and preventing violence and ensuring safety in schools.
As public outrage concerning the unsafe conditions of
45
46
American public schools has intensified, various states, including
State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 158-59 (Minn. 2000) (holding that the state need
not prove that the driver of a vehicle had knowledge of the existence of the open
bottle containing intoxicating liquor in order to convict driver of the
misdemeanor offense).
42. See PHILIP KAUFMAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. AND JUST., Indicators of
School Crime and Safety, 2000, NCES 2001-017/NCJ-184176 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/iscs00.txt (providing the latest U.S.
Dep’t. of Education and Justice statistics on school related crime and violence). In
1993, 1995, and 1997, approximately seven to eight percent of high school
students reported being threatened or injured with a weapon such as a gun, knife,
or club on school property in the past twelve months before the survey. Id. In
1997, eighteen percent of students reported carrying a weapon such as a gun,
knife, or club at any time in the past thirty days, while nine percent reported they
had carried the weapon while on school property. Id. Whereas twenty-three
percent of ninth graders carried a weapon in 1997 alone. Id.
43. Id. The presence of weapons at school can create an atmosphere of
intimidation, making both teaching and learning difficult. Id.
44. Id. Such measures may include adopting zero-tolerance policies (i.e., a
school or district policy that mandates predetermined consequences or
punishments for specific offenses), requiring students to wear school uniforms,
employing various security measures, having police or other law enforcement
personnel stationed at the school, and offering students various types of violence
prevention programs. Id. Approximately nine out of ten schools reported having
adopted zero-tolerance policies for firearms (ninety-four percent) and weapons
other than firearms (ninety-one percent). Id. In the 1996-97 school year, there
were over 5,000 students expelled for possession or use of a firearm and an
additional 3,300 were transferred to alternative schools. Id. at Table A6. Schools
have taken a number of measures to secure their grounds, such as requiring visitor
sign-in, using metal detectors; implementing closed-campus policies, drug and
weapon sweeps, and random metal detector checks on students. See id. at App. A.
45. See Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can’t Read ‘Cause Jane’s Got a Gun: The
Effects of Guns in Schools, and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281,
282 n.6 (1999) (citing Catherine J. Whitaker and Lisa D. Bastion, U.S. Dep’t. of
Just., Teenage Victims, A National Crime Survey Report (May 1991)). “Approximately
half of all violent crimes against youths aged 12 to 19 occur on school property or
adjacent streets.” Id. Approximately thirty-seven percent of violent crimes and
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47

Minnesota have been prompted to adopt laws designed to
48
eliminate crime and violence from schools. The United States
Congress has also adopted several measures directed at the
49
escalating violence in schools.
In 1993, Minnesota adopted section 609.66, subdivision 1d(a),
which makes possessing or storing a dangerous weapon on school
50
property a felony. Section 609.66, subdivision 1d(a), was amended
51
in 1994. The section was designed to regulate and promote safe
eighty-one percent of theft against younger teenagers occur at school. Id. “In 1989,
over 400,000 students aged 12 to 19 were victims of violent crime in or around
their schools within the previous six months.” Id. at n.9.
46. Some states, like Minnesota, contain no express statutory element
requiring that individuals charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on
school property must have knowledge of that possession. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 626.10(a)-(b) (West 2000) (stating “[a]ny person . . . who brings or possesses” a
weapon, as set forth in this section, upon school property is guilty of a public
offense, punishable by imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.237a(4) (Supp.
2001) (mandating that the possession of a weapon in a weapon free school zone is
a misdemeanor punishable by one or more of the following: imprisonment,
community service or fine); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05 (2001) (declaring a
person who “possesses” a firearm at a public gathering is guilty of a Class B
misdemeanor and defining “public gathering” as including schools or school
functions). On the other hand, some states outlawing possession of a weapon on
school property expressly require that a defendant have some form of knowledge
or intent. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1 (2000) (providing that a person
violates the statute when he “knowingly possesses” a knife while on school
grounds); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.06 (McKinney 2001) (prohibiting any person age
sixteen or older from “knowingly” possessing a weapon in or upon the grounds of
any school); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-7 (Michie 2000) (stating that “[a]ny
person . . . who intentionally carries, has in his possession, stores, keeps, leaves,
places or puts into the possession of another person . . . any dangerous weapon”
on school property is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. § 948.61(2)(a)
(2001) (stating that “[a]ny person who knowingly possesses or goes armed with a
dangerous weapon on school premises is guilty of [a] Class A misdemeanor”).
47. “[Minnesota] Representative Charles Weaver testified that three million
crimes occur on school campuses each year, 160,000 children skip school every
year for fear of being hurt, and weapons are appearing more frequently in
Minnesota schools.” In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 805 n.8 (Minn. 2000).
48. See generally Paul M. Bogos, Note, “Expelled. No Excuses. No Exceptions.” –
Michigan’s Zero-Tolerance Policy in Response to School Violence: M.C.L.A. Section
380.1311, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 357, 358-374 (Winter 1997) (discussing
violence in public schools and state legislative responses).
49. See Chamberlin, supra note 45, at 284-85 (citing the Gun-Free School
Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), (x) (2001), the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20
U.S.C. § 8921 (2001), the Safe Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5961, 5962
(2001), and the Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. § 5802 (2001)).
50. MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d(a) (2000). The section was introduced in
the legislature in three separate bills, none including a reference to knowledge or
intent. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805.
51. MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d(a) (Historical and Statutory Notes 2000)
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schools and to make the possession of weapons other than guns on
52
school property a felony. The issue that arises most frequently
with regards to section 609.66, subdivision 1d, is what exactly
53
constitutes a “dangerous weapon” or “firearm?” The Minnesota
Supreme Court had never addressed whether section 609.66,
subdivision 1d, created a strict liability crime or whether it required
54
some showing of knowledge or intent.
III. THE IN RE C.R.M. DECISION
A. The Facts
On November 2, 1998, a teacher found a folding knife with a
four-inch blade in fifteen-year-old C.R.M.’s coat pocket in the
course of a standard contraband check conducted on students’
55
coats at a juvenile day school in Anoka County. C.R.M.
immediately identified the coat as his but when asked what was in
56
the coat pocket, he said he did not know. Waneta Hord, the lead
teacher at the school, testified that when C.R.M. was told that a
knife was found in his pocket he replied, “Oh man, I forgot to take
57
it out. I was whittling this weekend.” C.R.M. was charged with
58
possession of a dangerous weapon on school property in violation
(deleting “‘as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 6, on’ following ‘or keeps a
dangerous weapon,’ inserted ‘or uses or brandishes a replica firearm or a BB gun
on’”).
52. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805-06.
53. See, e.g., State v. Coauette, 601 N.W.2d 443, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that a paintball gun is not a real weapon and, therefore, is not within the
Minn. Stat. section 609.02, subdivision 6, definition of “dangerous weapon”).
Minn. Stat. section 609.02, subdivision 6, states in relevant part:
“Dangerous weapon” means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or
any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or
great bodily harm, any combustible or flammable liquid or other device
or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm, or any fire
that is used to produce death or great bodily harm.
MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2000).
54. See In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 807.
55. Id. at 803. C.R.M. attended the Anoka County Juvenile Day School
pursuant to a prior dispositional order. Id. The school conducts contraband
searches on the students’ coats nearly every day. Id.
56. Id.
57. Trial Tr. ¶ 9. In accordance with school policy upon finding serious
contraband, school officials contacted the police. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 803.
58. C.R.M. did not contest at trial, nor on appeal, that the knife found in his
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59

of section 609.66, subdivision 1d(a).
Trial was held on November 18, 1998. At trial, C.R.M. testified
that he had forgotten the knife was still in his pocket from the prior
weekend and that before leaving for school he had patted himself
60
down but missed the knife. C.R.M.’s mother told the court that
C.R.M. had on a “double jacket” that day so even though he patted
himself down before leaving for school, he could not feel the
61
knife. Ms. Hord testified that C.R.M.’s reaction to the knife was
62
“spontaneous” and “believable.”
C.R.M. moved for a directed verdict, arguing that section
609.66, subdivision 1d, required that he knew that the knife was in
his coat pocket and that general intent required knowledge of
63
possession. After having heard all the evidence in the case, the
trial judge noted that he believed that C.R.M. brought the knife to
64
school “accidentally.” Despite believing C.R.M.’s assertions that he
did not know the knife was in his pocket while at school, the trial
court felt constrained to find C.R.M. guilty because Minn. Stat.
section 609.66, subdivision 1d(a) does not explicitly refer to any
65
intent or knowledge requirement. The trial court did, however,
recognize and note that the statute could be susceptible to another
interpretation, one requiring mens rea, but left that question open
66
for appeal.
67
The trial court found C.R.M. guilty of the charged offense. A
dispositional order was filed ordering C.R.M. to comply with
previously imposed conditions relating to earlier offenses, to write a
coat pocket was a “dangerous weapon” for purposes of Section 609.66, subdivision
1d(a). Appellant’s Br. at 5, n.2.
59. In re C.R.M., No. C6-98-2385, 1999 WL 595371, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) rev’d, 611 N.W.2d 802(Minn. 2000); MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d(a)
(2000).
60. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 803-04.
61. Id. at 804.
62. Id. at 803. Ms. Hord testified that C.R.M. was very cooperative throughout
questioning. Id. at 803. Anoka County police officer William Hammes gave a
similar account of C.R.M.’s reaction to the situation. Trial Tr. ¶¶ 13-16. A
probation officer also testifying at trial, told the court there was no evidence that
C.R.M. brought the knife to school to get into a fight. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at
804.
63. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 804; MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d (2000).
64. In re C.R.M., No. C6-98-2385, 1999 WL 595371, at *1.
65. Trial Tr. ¶ 21.
66. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 804. The trial court noted:
67. In re C.R.M., No. C6-98-2385, 1999 WL 595371, at *1 (holding that
subdivision 1d(a) did not require a defendant to have knowledge of possession
when entering school property).
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letter of apology and to possess no weapons, including knives, until
68
69
he turned nineteen. C.R.M. appealed the decision. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that proof of knowledge of possession of
70
the knife was not required to sustain a conviction. The Minnesota
71
Supreme Court granted review.
B. The Court’s Analysis
72

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.
The court noted that strict liability statutes are generally
73
disfavored and legislative intent to impose strict liability must be
74
clear. Section 609.66, subdivision 1d has never included a
75
reference to knowledge or intent. Because the statutory language
provided the court with little guidance, it turned to examining the
76
“public welfare” nature of section 609.66, subdivision 1d. The
court concluded that the nature of the weapon here – a knife – was
not so inherently dangerous that C.R.M. should be on notice that
68. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 804. For C.R.M.’s earlier offenses, he was
placed under the supervision of Anoka County Juvenile Corrections until his
nineteenth birthday. He was ordered to pay restitution to his victims of his assaults
in the amount of $85.47, to have no contact with the victims, one victim’s family
members and his accomplices, to engage in no assaultive or violent behavior, to
attend counseling and to be monitored under home electronic monitoring. Id. at
n.3.
69. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 804.
70. See id. at 804-05. The court of appeals concluded that C.R.M. knew he had
a duty to determine whether the knife was in his coat, but failed to do so. Id.
Because the appellate court felt C.R.M. should have known that he possessed the
knife while on school grounds, the trial court’s decision was affirmed. Id.
71. Id. at 804.
72. Id. at 810.
73. Id. at 805 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)). The
United States Supreme Court has suggested that some indication of congressional
intent, express or implied, is required to effectively dispense with mens rea as an
element of a crime. Staples, 511 U.S. at 604.
74. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805 (citing State v. Neisen, 415 NW.2d 326,
329 (Minn. 1987)). The court’s determination that the legislature intended to
create a strict liability crime can only be reached after a careful examination of the
statutory language. Id. at 805 (citing State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Minn.
1996)).
75. Id.; see also supra note 50. However, the United States Supreme Court has
noted that “[c]ertainly far more than a simple omission of the appropriate phrase
from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent
requirement.” In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 809 (quoting the Court in United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978)).
76. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805-06. The court noted that the two goals
underlying adoption of section 609.66, subdivision 1d, were to create safer schools
and to create consistent felonies. Id.
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77

mere possession would be a crime.
The court acknowledged the distinction between strict liability
crimes and those requiring a mens rea as created through its own
78
body of jurisprudence. The court indicated its heightened
concern regarding the importance of the level of punishment
attached to the offense in considering whether the legislature
79
intended strict liability.
In light of the long established principle in American criminal
jurisprudence that in common law crimes and in felony level
offenses mens rea is required, the court concluded there was not a
sufficiently clear expression of legislative intent to dispense with
80
mens rea with regards to section 609.66, subdivision 1d. The court
held that the state was required to prove that C.R.M. knew he
possessed the knife on school property as an element of the section
81
609.66, subdivision 1d offense charged.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE IN RE C.R.M. DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court properly interpreted section
609.66 when it held that subdivision 1d requires proof that an
individual had knowledge that he or she possessed, stored or kept a
82
dangerous weapon on school property. The Supreme Court’s
holding depends on a common-sense evaluation of the nature of
the particular conduct the legislature has subjected to regulation,
the expectations and knowledge that individuals may reasonably
have with regard to that conduct, and the penalty attached to a
83
violation.

77. Id. at 810. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that even
dangerous items can, in some cases, be so commonplace and generally available
that the court would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of
strict regulation. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611.
78. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 807, supra notes 35-38, 41.
79. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 808-09. Of great significance to the court was
the legislative discussion of the severe penalty attached to section 609.66,
subdivision 1d, because it emphasized that the weapon possession statute was to be
more than merely regulatory in nature. Id. That is, an important objective of the
statute was to expand felony level penalties for possession of dangerous weapons
other than guns in school zones. Id. at 805.
80. Id. at 808-09.
81. Id. at 810. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether
C.R.M. had knowledge of possession of the knife while on school property. Id.
82. Id. at 810 (construing MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subd. 1d (2000)).
83. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).
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After looking for and failing to find an express statement, the
court engaged in a thorough analysis of section 609.66, subdivision
1d and found no clear legislative intent to enact a strict liability
85
offense. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s position is strengthened
by well-established jurisprudential history that requires clear
86
legislative intent to dispense with proof of mens rea. The “rule of
lenity,” which requires penal statutes to be strictly construed in
favor of a criminal defendant, is further indication that knowledge
87
of possession is required by section 609.66, subdivision 1d.
“Application of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will
provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and
strikes the appropriate balance between the legislature, the
88
prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in concluding that
the legislature intended section 609.66, subdivision 1d, to be more
89
than merely regulatory. When punishment of the wrongdoer far
outweighs regulation of the social order as a purpose of the law in
question, as does section 609.66, then mens rea should be
90
required.
84. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805 (citing State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 74
(Minn. 1996)). Silence concerning the mens rea required for violation of section
609.66, subdivision 1d, by itself, does not suggest that the legislature intended to
dispense with the conventional mens rea requirement per se, thus requiring the
defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal. See Staples, 511 U.S. at
605.
85. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d. at 808-09; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2000)
(providing that the object of statutory interpretation is to determine and
effectuate legislative intent).
86. See State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1987). The Neisen court
was guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross
misdemeanor or felony liability is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by
fault, the legislative intent must be clear. Id. Indication of legislative intent,
express or implied, is necessary to create a strict liability offense. See Staples, 511
U.S. at 606.
87. See Orsello, 554 N.W.3d at 74; see also Rewis V. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
812 (1971) (stating that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in the favor of lenity.”).
88. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985).
89. See In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 809. The bill’ s legislative sponsor
emphasized that it was intended to create and expand felony level penalties to
include the possession of all dangerous weapons on school grounds. Id.
90. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (interpreting Sayre’s identification of the contours of the public welfare
offense doctrine in Public Welfare supra, note 18, at 78). Likewise, if the penalty is
light, involving a relatively small fine and not including imprisonment, then mens
rea is probably not required. Id.
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Public welfare offenses infer from silence a legislative intent to
91
dispense with conventional mens rea requirements. However, great
care is taken to avoid interpreting statutes as eliminating mens rea
where doing so criminalizes a broad range of what would otherwise
92
93
be innocent conduct. In applying the reasoning of Staples, the
Minnesota Supreme Court observed that knives as common
household utensils are not inherently dangerous, as they can be
94
used for a variety of completely innocent purposes. In general, the
destructive or injurious potential of knives cannot be said to put
individuals on notice of the likelihood of regulation for their
possession to justify interpreting section 609.66, subdivision 1d as
95
dispensing with mens rea.
The court’s heightened concern regarding the elimination of
a mens rea requirement when it comes to felony offenses is well
placed. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out,
imprisonment seems incompatible with the reduced culpability
96
required for public welfare offenses. Commentators studying the
early public welfare cases have argued that offenses punishable by
imprisonment, such as the offense charged in In re C.R.M., cannot
be understood to be public welfare offenses, but must require mens
97
rea. “Certainly, the cases that first defined the concept of the
public welfare offense almost uniformly involved statutes that
provided for only light penalties such as fines or short jail
98
sentences, not imprisonment in the state penitentiary.”
The court of appeals acknowledged the legitimacy of the
heightened concern surrounding the elimination of mens rea with
99
regard to a felony offense but erroneously concluded that because
91. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994). In such cases, the
United States Supreme Court has “‘reasoned that as long as a defendant knows
that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him in
responsible relation to a public danger . . . he should be alerted to the probability
of strict regulation.” Id. (citation omitted). The Staples court concluded that guns
do not fall within the category of dangerous devices as it has been developed in
public welfare offense cases. Id. at 607-15.
92. Id. at 610.
93. Id.
94. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 810.
95. Cf. Staples, 511 U.S. at 611-12 (reasoning that gun owners are not
sufficiently put on notice that regulation is likely simply because guns have
dangerous potential).
96. Id. at 617-18.
97. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 617 (citing PERKINS, supra note 31, at 793-98).
98. Staples, 511 U.S. at 616.
99. In re C.R.M., No. C6-98-2385, 1999 WL 595371, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
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C.R.M. received a light sentence, the statute constituted a strict
100
liability offense. It is not justifiable to remove the mens rea
requirement from an offense where the actual sentence is light but
101
the potential sentence is heavy.
Incarceration, with its
extraordinary effects on both the defendant’s liberty and status
102
within society, requires moral culpability. Accordingly, in the
absence of very clear legislative intent, courts have historically
refused to eliminate mens rea requirements in the context of felony
offenses.
In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling is sound
103
from a public policy standpoint. Blameworthiness or intent is an
element of crime “first, as a survival of true moral standards;
second, because to punish what would not be blameworthy in an
average member of the community would be to enforce a standard
which was indefensible theoretically, and which practically was too
104
high for that community.”
“[T]he fact remains that the
determination of the boundary between intent and negligence
105
spells freedom or condemnation for thousands of individuals.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court is also wise to call attention to the
fact that “[i]n many if not most cases prosecuted under a statute
proscribing occurrences on school property . . . the accused will be
106
a school-aged minor.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision that Minn. Stat.
section 609.66, subdivision 1d requires knowledge of possession of
1999).
100. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 n.14 (Minn. 2000). “The fact that
appellant received a light sentence is of no consequence in the determination of
whether mens rea is required under the statute because obviously the state’s burden
of proof of guilt cannot be determined on the level of sentence the trial court
later imposes.” Id.
101. See id. Indeed, the infamy of the crime still remains that of a felony,
“which, says Maitland, is ‘ . . . as bad a word as you can give to a man or thing.’”
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (quoting 2 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 465 (Cambridge University Press 1898)).
102. Levenson, supra note 15, at 405 (citing Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and
the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 150 (hereinafter Packer, Mens Rea)).
103. “To inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely
innocent, who caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would
so outrage the feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement.” Sayre,
Public Welfare, supra note 18, at 56. Minnesota law provides that the courts may be
guided by the presumption that the legislature does not intend absurd or
unreasonable results. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17, subd. 1 (2000).
104. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (34th prtg. 1938).
105. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S 246, 256 n.14 (1952).
106. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 2000).
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a dangerous weapon is in accord with modern scholars’ views,
107
which generally are critical of strict criminal liability crimes. The
general consensus is that punishing conduct without reference to
the actor’s state of mind fails to reach the desired end and is
108
unjust. Professors LaFave and Scott observe:
It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an
awareness of the factors making it criminal does not mark
the actor as one who needs to be subjected to punishment
in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in
the future, nor does it single him out as a socially
dangerous individual who needs to be incapacitated or
reformed. It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the
stigma of a criminal conviction without being morally
blameworthy. Consequently, on either a preventative or
retributive theory of criminal punishment, the criminal
109
sanction is inappropriate in the absence of mens rea.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in In re C.R.M. is not
at all inconsistent with those applied in other jurisdictions across
the country. Many courts, in various contexts, have gone through
comparable examinations of statutes and have similarly imposed a
mens rea requirement even where, as here, the statute is silent on
the matter. For instance, Indiana courts review some of the
following factors, which are in accordance with those considered by
the Minnesota Supreme Court, when determining whether mens rea
is an essential element of a given crime: 1) the legislative history of
a criminal statute; 2) similar or related statutes; 3) the severity of
the punishment attached to an offense; 4) the danger to the public
of prohibited conduct; and 5) the defendant’s opportunity to
110
ascertain whether conduct is prohibited.
Finally, the majority opinion appropriately points out that the
special concurrence misreads and overstates the majority decision
when it suggests that the majority has created “a new standard
requiring the legislature to explicitly state its intent to create strict
111
liability offenses in all felony level crimes.” The majority opinion

107. LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 248.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 102).
110. See Wagerman v. State, 597 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of serial number’s
alteration in order to be convicted for possession of a handgun with an altered
serial number).
111. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 810.
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retains Minnesota’s longstanding precedent relating to strict
liability crimes that requires only that there be clear legislative
112
intent to dispense with mens rea. The majority is merely trying to
re-emphasize its main position regarding legislative intent; express
or implied, it must be clear in order to eliminate the requirement
of mens rea.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court has correctly interpreted
Minnesota Statute section 609.66, subdivision 1d(a) as requiring
the state to prove that a defendant knew that he possessed, stored
or kept a dangerous weapon while on school property. The In re
C.R.M. decision is in accordance with the legislative intent behind
enactment of the section when analyzed in light of United States
Supreme Court and Minnesota decisions concerning the mens rea
in enforcement of statutes enacted for the welfare of the public. It
also provides the legislature with a clear standard to guide its
creation of strict liability offenses. The decision follows the longstanding principles of American criminal jurisprudence that
require mens rea as the rule, rather than the exception.

112. Id. The majority opinion states, “[i]f it is the legislature’s purpose to
convict a student for a felony for the unknowing possession of a knife on school
property, it should say so directly and unequivocally with respect to that specific
crime . . . .” Id. at 809. This statement is not unlike that in Staples: “[I]f Congress
had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly ignorant of the
offending characteristics of their weapons, and to subject them to lengthy prison
terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect.” Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 620 (1994).

